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ABSTRACT
Microcode is an abstraction layer used by modern x86 processors
that interprets user-visible CISC instructions to hardware-internal
RISC instructions. The capability to update x86 microcode enables a
vendor to modify CPU behavior in-field, and thus patch erroneous
microarchitectural processes or even implement new features. Most
prominently, the recent Spectre and Meltdown vulnerabilities
were mitigated by Intel via microcode updates. Unfortunately, mi-
crocode is proprietary and closed source, and there is little publicly
available information on its inner workings.
In this paper, we present new reverse engineering results that
extend and complement the public knowledge of proprietary mi-
crocode. Based on these novel insights, we show how modern
system defenses and tools can be realized in microcode on a com-
mercial, off-the-shelf AMD x86 CPU. We demonstrate how well-
established system security defenses such as timing attack miti-
gations, hardware-assisted address sanitization, and instruction
set randomization can be realized in microcode. We also present a
proof-of-concept implementation of a microcode-assisted instru-
mentation framework. Finally, we show how a secure microcode
update mechanism and enclave functionality can be implemented
in microcode to realize a small trusted execution environment. All
microcode programs and the whole infrastructure needed to repro-
duce and extend our results are publicly available.
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1 INTRODUCTION
New vulnerabilities, design flaws, and attack techniques with devas-
tating consequences for the security and safety of computer systems
are announced on a regular basis [20]. The underlying faults range
from critical memory safety violations [22] or input validation [21]
in software to race conditions or side-channel attacks in the under-
lying hardware [3, 27, 37, 39, 40, 45, 53]. To cope with erroneous
behavior and to reduce the attack surface, various defenses have
been developed and integrated in software and hardware over the
last decades [75, 78].
Generally speaking, defenses implemented in software can be cat-
egorized in either compiler-assisted defenses [5, 9, 19, 54, 60, 65, 70]
or binary defenses [1, 25, 32, 64, 80]. Note that operating sys-
tem changes [5, 8, 19, 65] represent an orthogonal approach to
serve both compiler-assisted and binary defenses. While compiler-
assisted defenses require access to the source code and re-com-
pilation of the software, binary defenses based on static binary
rewriting [51, 67, 79] or dynamic instrumentation [12, 28, 55, 58] can
also be leveraged for legacy and Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS)
programs. However, these binary defense strategies have two funda-
mental drawbacks: on the one hand, binary rewriting relies on the
ability to accurately discover and disassemble all executable code in
a given binary executable [6]. Any misclassified code or data yields
incomplete soundness and thus cannot provide specific security
guarantees, causes program termination, or incorrect computations.
On the other hand, dynamic instrumentation executes unmodified
binaries and inserts instrumentation logic with methods such as
emulation or hooking during runtime. While this approach does not
require the availability of a perfect disassembly, it typically causes
significant performance overheads and thus can be prohibitively
expensive in practice.
Over the past decades, various defensemechanisms have been im-
plemented in hardware to increase both security and performance.
For example, dedicated security features to mitigate exploitation
of memory-corruption vulnerabilities include Data Execution Pre-
vention [5], Execute-Only Memory (XoM) [8, 19, 43], Control Flow
Integrity (CFI) [1, 17] and Shadow Stacks [17, 23]. Moreover, so-
phisticated trusted computing security features were integrated in
Central Processing Units (CPUs) [4, 18].
But not only novel defense mechanisms have been integrated in
hardware: Similarly to any complex software system, erratic behav-
ior exist in virtually any commercially-available CPU [3, 40]. To this
end, x86 CPU vendors integrated in-field update features (e.g., to
turn off defective parts or patch erroneous behavior). More precisely,
the microcode unit, which translates between user-visible Complex
Instruction Set Computer (CISC) Instruction Set Architecture (ISA)
and hardware-internal Reduced Instruction Set Computer (RISC)
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ISA, can be updated bymeans of so-calledmicrocode updates [49, 56].
Since microcode is proprietary and closed source, and more and
more complex security features are integrated into hardware with
the help of microcode (e.g., Intel SGX [18]), there is only a limited
understanding of its inner workings and thus we need to trust the
CPU vendors that the security mechanisms are implemented cor-
rectly. In particular, the CPU’s trustworthiness is challenged since
even recently published microcode updates have been shown to
cause incorrect behavior [42] and several attacks on hardware se-
curity features have been demonstrated recently [13, 37, 45, 52, 53].
Moreover, since older CPU generations are not updated to defend
against sophisticated attacks such as Spectre orMeltdown [41],
these CPUs are unprotected against the aforementioned attacks
which find more and more adoption into real-world attacks [31].
Goals and Contributions. In this work, we focus on construc-
tive applications of x86 processor microcode for the modern system
security landscape. Our goal is to shed light on how currently em-
ployed defenses may be realized using microcode and thus tackle
shortcomings of the opaque nature of x86 CPUs. Building upon
our recent work on microcode [49], we first present novel reverse
engineering strategies which ultimately provide fine-grained under-
standing of x86 microcode for a COTS AMD K8 CPU. On this basis,
we demonstrate multiple constructive applications implemented
in microcode which considerably reduce the attack surface and
simultaneously reduce performance overheads of software-only so-
lutions. Finally, we discuss benefits and challenges for customizable
microcode for future systems and applications.
In summary, our main contributions are:
• UncoveringNewx86MicrocodeDetails.Wepresent new
reverse engineering results that extend and complement the
publicly available knowledge of AMD K8 CPU microcode
technology, specifically its microcode Read-Only Memory
(ROM). To this end, we develop a novel reverse engineer-
ing strategy that combines chip-level reverse engineering
and image processing with a custom microcode emulator
in order to recover and validate microcode semantics in a
semi-automatic fashion. In particular, this reverse engineer-
ing step enables us to better understand the hitherto opaque
microcode by analysis of its ROM and microcode updates.
• Perspectives of Customizable Microcode. We analyze
the capabilities of microcode and its updates to identify build-
ing blocks that can be used to strengthen, extend, or sup-
plement system security defenses. This includes microcode-
based methods to enable or disable CPU features at runtime,
a method to intercept low-level CPU processes, an isolated
execution environment within the microcode engine, and the
possibility to extend and modify the x86 ISA. With regards
to the trustworthiness of systems, we discuss a method to de-
tect the presence of microcode backdoors and the challenges
associated with such a detection.
• Implementation of Microcode-Assisted Defenses. We
show how modern system defenses and tools can be imple-
mented with microcode on a COTS AMD x86 CPU using the
identified primitives. To this end, we implemented several
case studies to demonstrate that timing attack mitigation,
hardware-assisted address sanitization, and instruction set
randomization can be realized in microcode. In addition, we
realize a microcode-assisted hooking framework that allows
fast filtering directly in microcode. Finally, we show how a se-
cure microcode update mechanism and enclave functionality
can be implemented in microcode. The framework used for
the deconstruction andmanipulation ofmicrocode, including
the assembler and disassembler, as well as our created mi-
crocode programs and the microcode emulator are publicly
available at https://github.com/RUB-SysSec/Microcode [57].
2 BACKGROUND AND RELATEDWORK
In the following, we first present the technical background infor-
mation needed to understand the microcode details presented in
this paper. Note that the background for the individual defenses is
covered in their respective subsections in Section 5. In addition, we
review prior work that demonstrated the capabilities of microcode
and discuss how our contributions presented in this paper relate to
existing work.
2.1 Microcode Background
The ISA of a processor defines the available instructions and serves
as an interface between software and hardware [74]. We refer to
the actual hardware implementation of an ISA as microarchitecture.
The Instruction Decode Unit (IDU) generates control words based
on the currently decoded instruction and is a crucial component of
the microarchitecture especially for CISC processors with complex
instructions. The IDU of modern x86 processors is implemented as
a hybrid of a hardwired decode unit, which consists of sequential
logic, and a microcoded decode unit, which replays precomputed
control words named microinstructions. They are stored in a ded-
icated, on-chip microcode ROM. The microcode is organized in
so-called triads containing three microinstructions and a sequence
word, which denotes the next triad to execute. In the microcode
address space, triads can only be addressed as a whole, i.e., indi-
vidual bytes are not accessible. There are multiple categories of
microinstructions like arithmetic, logic, memory load/store, and
special microinstructions.
The microcode of modern x86 processors can be updated at
runtime in order to fix errata and add new features without the
need to resort to product recalls [49, 56]. These updates are usually
applied early during boot by the BIOS/EFI or operating system.
The process is initiated by loading the microcode update file to
main memory and writing the virtual address to a Model-specific
register (MSR). The CPU then copies the microinstructions of the
update to the dedicated on-chip microcode RandomAccess Memory
(RAM). The update engine also sets the match registers according
to the values given in the update file. The match registers contain
microcode ROM addresses and act as breakpoints. They redirect
control to the triads of the update stored inside the on-chip RAM
once a breakpoint in microcode ROM is hit. Complex or rarely
used x86 instructions are implemented with microcode and have
a predefined entry point in microcode ROM. Hence, microcoded
x86 instructions can be intercepted by placing a breakpoint at the
corresponding entry point. The triads in the microcode update
define the new logic of the x86 instruction.
2.2 Related Work
Microcode and Microcode Updates. Previous work [7, 11, 14]
already provided indicators that the microcode update functionality
of several CPUs families is not sufficiently protected and might al-
low for custom updates to be applied. Koppe et al. [49] then reverse
engineered both the update mechanism of AMD K8 and K10 CPUs
as well as the encoding of microcode to a point that allowed the
creation of custom microcode updates. These updates implemented
simple microcode applications such as basic instrumentation and
backdoors, which were applicable to unmodified CPU. Other work
highlighting the capabilities of microcode was presented by Tri-
ulzi [76, 77], but details of the implementation are not publicly
available.
In this paper, we substantially extend on these insights and per-
form further in-depth reverse engineering and analysis of the mi-
crocode ROM. By understanding the ROM mapping, we are able to
disassemble the microcode of arbitrary x86 instructions to enable
the implementation of sophisticated microprograms, as demon-
strated in later sections of this work.
Microcoded Shadow Stacks. Davi et al. [24] introduced an ap-
proach called Hardware-Assisted Flow Integrity eXtension (HAFIX)
and showed that it is possible to implement a so-called shadow
stack [23] using microcode (in cooperation with researchers from
Intel). However, HAFIX relied both on a compile-time component
to add additional instructions to the binary, and is only available
on development CPUs, not on standard consumer hardware. Intel
also announced the introduction of shadow stacks into end user
CPUs with the addition of Control-Flow Enforcement Technol-
ogy (CET) [17]. This technology tracks all calls and returns which
allows checking whether the normal stack and the shadow stack
point to the same return address. If a difference is encountered,
an exception is raised. Additionally, the memory pages containing
the shadow stacks are protected using special page table attributes.
Once CPUs with this technology will reach the market, shadow
stacks will be available in production code with (almost) no addi-
tional performance overhead.
In this paper, we present several designs and proof-of-concept
implementations of microcode-assisted systems defenses beyond
shadow stacks. In addition, our paper and the supplementary mate-
rial [57] will enable other researchers to build similar microcode-
based system defenses and explore this area further.
3 MICROCODE REVERSE ENGINEERING
A key contribution of our work presented in this paper is to fur-
ther analyze the ROM readouts provided by Koppe et al. [49] to
gather more details on the implementation of both microcode itself
and—more importantly—on the microcoded instructions. While the
authors were able to identify operations and triads in the readout,
they were unable to reconstruct how they map to logical addresses.
Therefore, they could not locate and analyze the microcode that
implements a specific x86 instruction. However, these steps are cru-
cial in the hooking of more advanced x86 instructions that require
knowledge of the underlying implementation in the microcode
ROM. The analysis of existing microcode implementations was
essential for the case studies presented in Section 5.
Figure 1: High-level overview of the individual steps of the
ROM reverse engineering process.
The key requirement for such an analysis is the ability to lo-
cate the corresponding implementation in the microcode ROM. We
therefore require a mapping of observable addresses to the phys-
ical location in the ROM readout. Going forward, we define two
different classes of addresses:
• logical addresses are usedwhen themicrocode software refers
to a specific triad (e. g., in the match registers or jumps)
• physical addresses are the addresses assigned to triads in the
ROM readouts during analysis.
These addresses are not related to the virtual and physical addresses
usedwhen addressing themainmemory—what is commonly known
as the virtual memory layout of processes. Also note that the address
granularity for microcode is one triad, the individual operations
forming a triad are not addressable.
Thus, it is our goal to reverse engineer the algorithm used to
map a given logical address to its corresponding physical address.
The high level overview of this process is illustrated in Figure 1. We
used the following steps to recover the ordered microcode ROM:
• 1○ Convert Scanning Electron Microscope (SEM) images of
each region to bitstrings with the aid of image recognition
software.
• 2○ Reorder and combine the resulting bitstrings into a list
of unordered triads.
Figure 2: SEM image of region R1 showing arrays A1 to A4
and the SRAM holding the microcode update. The higher
resolution raw image is available in Appendix A.1.
• 3○ Reconstruct the mapping between logical and physical
microcode addresses as well as reorder the triads according
to this mapping.
• 4○ Disassemble the resulting triad list into a continuous,
ordered stream of instructions.
The first step, the conversion of images to bitstrings, was already
performed by Koppe et al. [49] and we used this data as our starting
point for our further analysis. The authors also already combined
parts of the readouts into triads. We build upon this and recovered
the remaining part of the triads, which is depicted as step 2○ in the
figure. The details of this step are described in Sections 3.1 and 3.2.
Step 3○, the recovery of the mapping algorithm, constituted the
majority of our efforts. We outline the approach we used in Sec-
tion 3.3 and provide details of the solutions we developed in the
following sections. The mapping was reverse engineered for an
AMD K8 processor. However, our approach is also applicable to the
K10 architecture based on the similarities between the two archi-
tectures. For the last step, we extended the disassembler used by
Koppe et al. [49] to include details learned during our own analysis.
3.1 Physical Layout
The physical storage is composed of three larger regions of ROM (R1
to R3), which were identified as the area containing the operations,
and a smaller region (R4) containing the sequence words. Previous
work [49] already performed permutations such as inversion and
interleaving of bit rows to receive whole operations in the correct
bit order. In addition, the algorithm for constructing triads out of
three operations was known. The triads are built by loading a single
operation out of each of the three regions R1 to R3 and loading
the corresponding sequence word from region R4. Thereby, the
operations belonging to one triad have the same offset relative to
the start of their corresponding region. The different subregions
of a single ROM region are illustrated in Figure 2, more technical
details are provided in Appendix A.1. We will use the same naming
convention in the following.
The hardware layout suggested that the triads are organized
in four arrays (A1 to A4), with A1, A3 and A4 containing data
for 1024 triads each and A2, which is physically smaller than the
other arrays, for 768 triads. This organization means that the first
triad will use bits extracted from R1:A1, R2:A1 and R3:A1 as its
operations and the sequence word is obtained from the bits located
in R4:A1. As the regions are no longer relevant after combining
the triads, they will be omitted in further notations. Each of the
arrays is subdivided into blocks B1 to B4, each containing 256 triads.
The exception to this is the array A2: while the hardware layout
suggests the presence of four blocks with a smaller number of triads
each, we mapped the contents to three blocks with 256 triads each.
This means array A2 contains only 768 triads in contrast to the
1024 triads contained in the other arrays.
We were also able to locate the microcode patch RAM, which is
loaded with the microcode updates during runtime. The RAM needs
to be placed physically close to the rest of the microcode engine to
keep signal paths short, however previously it was unknown where
exactly it is located. Using new images taken with a SEM, we could
classify the area between arrays A2 and A3 as Static RandomAccess
Memory (SRAM). The area is marked in Figure 2.We determined the
storage type based on detailed images of the region and additional
cross-section images. Both showed visual structures specific to
SRAM. This location also contains a visually different control logic,
which also indicates a different type of storage than the rest of
the region. A higher resolution image and additional details are
available in Appendix A.1. It should be noted that the usage of
two different classes of storage in this close proximity implies a
highly optimized hardware layout. The SRAM marked in the figure
contains 32×64 bits, which is the amount of data needed per region
for 32 triads. This corresponds to the maximum update size of
32 triads determined in our experiments. Due to the additional
complexity of implementing a fast readable and writable memory
in hardware, the SRAM occupies roughly the same space as a ROM
block with 256 triads.
3.2 Physical Ordering
Another insight gained from the available readout was that not only
the three operations forming a triad exhibited data dependencies
between each other (suggesting that the triads are indeed correctly
combined), but in some cases data flow was visible between triads
immediately following each other. This means the readout already
partially placed related triads close to each other. Based on this
observation, we retained the triad order and by convention placed
all triads after one another with increasing addresses. This yielded
what we considered a continuous physical memory space with
addresses starting at 0 and increasing with each triad to 0xEFF. This
corresponded with the observation that the microcode patch RAM
starts at the address 0xF00 for the K8 series of processors.
Our physical memory space assumed an arbitrary ordering of
A1 – A3 – A4 – A2, so A1 would contain addresses from 0x0 to
0x3FF, A3 from 0x400 to 0x7FF, A4 from 0x800 to 0xBFF and A2
from 0xC00 to 0xEFF. We placed A2 last because it contained less
triads which we assumed to be missing at the end of the addressable
space. In each array, we ordered the blocks starting from the bottom
of the image in Figure 2, omitting the missing block B4 in array A2.
Physical address 0x0 is thus located in A1:B1 and 0xEFF in A2:B3.
3.3 Mapping Recovery Approach
Our recovery approach is based on inferring the mapping based on
address pairs. We chose this approach because it was infeasible to
recover the mapping via hardware analysis. The addressing logic is
complex and the connections span multiple layers, each of which
would require delayering and subsequent imaging. Each address
pair maps a logical (microcode) address to a physical address. Once
the recovered function correctly produces the physical address
for any given logical address in our test set, we can assume that
it will be correct for any further translations. We thus needed a
sufficiently large collection of address pairs. Unfortunately, the
microcode updates only provided two usable data points.
Therefore, we developed an approach that (i) executes all ROM
triads on the CPU individually and extracts the observable seman-
tics of a given logical address, (ii) emulates each triad we acquired
from the physical ROM readout in a custom microcode emulator to
extract the semantics for a given physical address, and (iii) corre-
lates the extracted semantics to find matching pairs of physical and
logical addresses. Details of this process are described in Section 3.4.
This resulted in a total of 54 address pairs. The results were then
reviewed in a manual analysis step to find the correct permutation
of triads for a given block. Once a permutation candidate for a block
is found, it can be verified by checking the correctness of additional
triads. Both the process and its results are described in Section 3.5.
In combination with executing known triads directly from ROM
and extracting their side effects, we can correlate the emulated
instructions with their counterparts with known addresses.
3.4 Microcode Emulation
In order to gather a sufficiently large number of data points to
reverse engineer the fine grained mapping of the ROM addresses,
we implemented a microcode emulation engine. This emulation
engine is designed to replicate the behavior of the CPU during the
execution of a given triad. This means that for any given input,
the output of both the physical CPU and our emulation engine
should be identical. As our analysis framework is implemented in
Python, we also chose this language to implement the emulator.
The emulator is designed to interpret the bitstrings extracted from
the CPU and first disassembles them using our framework. For
each individual micro-op, this yields the operation as well as the
source and target operands. The operations itself are implemented
as Python lambdas modifying the indicated registers. This allows
for simple extension of the supported instruction list. For each triad
the emulator returns a changeset indicating the changed registers
and their new values. Currently this is done on a triad-by-triad basis
to support our reverse engineering method. However, by supplying
the changed register set as the input state for the next triad, the
emulation can be performed for any number of triads in sequence.
The emulation engine currently supports all of the identified arith-
metic microcode operations. Additionally, we supply a whitelist of
instructions that produce no visible effect on the specified registers.
While these instructions have side effects when executed on the
CPU, they are treated as no-ops, because only the visible state of the
registers is considered in our further analysis. The instructions and
their behavior are based on previous reverse engineering results.
We ensured that we correctly identified a certain instruction by
executing the bitstring of the instruction in a microcode update
applied to a real CPU and observing the effects on the specified
registers with varying inputs.
However, as the ROM contains operations that implement un-
known behavior, most importantly reading and writing internal
status registers or collecting information on the currently executed
instruction, we were unable to accurately emulate all of the triads.
Also the readout itself introduced both potential bit errors as well
as sections that are unable to be read due to dust particles or other
disturbances in the raw image. We thus opted to only consider
triads for further analysis that (i) contain only known instructions
and (ii) were not part of an unreadable section. This emulation
yielded the behavior of triads with known physical addresses for a
given input state. The input state assigned a different value to every
x86 and usable microcode register. During testing we observed that
not all microcode registers can be freely assigned to, some will
trigger erratic CPU behavior leading to crashes or loss of control.
Thus, we had to exclude certain registers from our tests. Our input
and output state contains all six x86 general purpose registers (we
excluded the stack manipulation registers EBP and ESP) as well as
in total 22 internal microcode registers.
To gather the behavior for known logical addresses, we forced
execution of each ROM triad directly on the CPU. For this execu-
tion, we chose the same input state that was previously used for
the emulation. The input state was set by a sequence of x86 instruc-
tions setting the x86 registers to the chosen values. The microcode
registers were then set after entering microcode by a sequence of
micro-ops preceding the jump to the triad address to be tested. The
output was gathered by writing out the changed registers as speci-
fied by our emulator to x86 registers using microcode executed after
the tested triad. Due to the different values for each register, we
could determine which register was used as an input in the tested
triad as well as the operation performed on it. However, we also
had to exclude a large number of logical addresses as those triads
lead to a loss of control or showed a behavior that was independent
of the given input state. In combination, these two tests yielded a
collection of address pairs consisting out of the physical address of
a candidate triad and the logical address of the triad.
3.5 Permutation Algorithms
After gathering the microcode address pairs, we had to reconstruct
the function used to map these onto each other. Due to the hard-
ware layout and hardware design possibilities, we determined a
number of different candidate permutation functions. Additionally,
we used the data points gathered in the previous step to develop
new algorithmic options. We then applied these possible functions
in combination to test whether they were used for a specific triad.
Figure 3: Translation of logical to physical microcode ROM addresses.
Via this empirical testing, we found that the ROM uses the fol-
lowing permutations:
• T: table based 16 triad-wise permutation, illustrated in Ta-
ble 1
• R: reverse counting direction, mapping higher physical ad-
dress triads to lower logical addresses
• S: pairwise swap two consecutive triads
• L: custom table based 16 triad-wise permutation for last
block, illustrated in Table 1
To determine the combination of permutations used for a specific
address pair, we verified the possibilities by calculating the physical
address for the given logical address. If the result matches the
expected value, the combination is correct. The found combination
is then used to calculate the physical addresses for the rest of the
data points. Once a mismatch is found, the first approach is repeated
to determine the next combination of permutations.
We determined that the mapping function is constant for 256
triads at a time, then the combination of algorithms changes. We
also had to account for potentially swapped 256 triad blocks, so
in case of a mismatch the remaining triad blocks in a region were
then considered. This yielded the mapping algorithm for all but the
last 256 triads. The last block uses a different mapping algorithm
that was reconstructed manually. The detailed mapping of all triad
blocks is given in Figure 3; Table 1 illustrates the permutation
algorithms T and L.
4 MICROCODE PRIMITIVES
Microcode programs supported by modern processors combined
with the ability to update this microcode can provide a range of
useful security primitives that can be used to build system defenses.
In the following, we explore several key primitives and discuss in
Section 5 how system defenses can be implemented based on our
analysis results described in the previous section.
Enabling or disabling CPU features at runtime
Despite recently uncovered security issues such as Spectre
and Meltdown [37, 45, 53], speculative execution is an impor-
tant feature that enables the performance of current CPU families.
While the naïve countermeasure—disabling speculative execution
completely—provides a high level of security, it significantly re-
duces the performance of a given system. However, if the specula-
tive execution could be disabled only temporally or only for certain
Physical logical - T logical - L
0x00 0x00 0x00
0x10 0x20 0x10
0x20 0x40 0x20
0x30 0x60 0x30
0x40 0x80 0x40
0x50 0xA0 0x50
0x60 0xC0 0x60
0x70 0xE0 0x70
0x80 0x10 0xF0 (RS)
0x90 0x30 0xE0 (RS)
0xA0 0x50 0xD0 (RS)
0xB0 0x70 0xC0 (RS)
0xC0 0x90 0xB0 (RS)
0xD0 0xB0 0xA0 (RS)
0xE0 0xD0 0x90 (RS)
0xF0 0xF0 0x80 (RS)
Table 1: Translation of addresses for the T and L algorithms.
The L algorithm applies the R and S permutations to the
higher addresses after the table based permutation.
program states, a trade-off between security and performance could
be implemented.
Another example of a feature that can be used by both benign and
malicious applications is the availability of high-resolution timers.
Such timers allow an attacker to abuse microarchitectural timing
side channels to gather information from otherwise inaccessible
contexts [13, 39, 46, 62]. In both cases, microcode can improve
security by applying a fine-grained permission model on top of
existing protection mechanisms by restricting features to certain
applications or contexts only.
Intercepting low-level CPUprocessesA core functionality of
microcode is the decoding of instructions. By intercepting this step
during the execution of x86 code, it is possible to apply fine-grained
control over the behavior of instructions, programs, and the system
as a whole. From a security perspective, additional functionality
can be added to existing instructions, special handling for corner
cases can be inserted, and security checks can be included.
Besides changing and extending the instruction decoding, it is
also possible to influence other aspects of the CPU’s operation. For
example, the exception handling mechanism is implemented with
the help of microcode. Before an exception reaches the kernel-level
x86 code, microcode can change themetadata passed to the kernel or
handle the exception without involving the kernel at all. By directly
modifying the exception handling in microcode, expensive context
switches can be avoided. This allows, for example, special handling
of page faults to implement page-based memory separation in a
way that is completely transparent to the kernel.
Isolated execution environment The microcode engine pro-
vides a fully-featured execution environment that cannot be inter-
cepted by the running kernel in any way. Any exception delivered
while microcode is running will be stalled until the current decod-
ing is complete. Moreover, any state that is not explicitly written
out will be contained in the microcode engine and cannot be ac-
cessed. More specifically, both the running kernel and hypervisors
are unable to inspect the execution state of the microcode engine.
This provides an enclave-like environment in which computations
on sensitive data can be performed in an opaque way. Only the
results will be passed to the operating system, protecting secret
keys or other data inside the microcode.
Extending and modifying the x86 instruction set By either
reusing no longer used x86 instructions or adding entirely new
instructions to the decoding process, microcode can enable func-
tionality not found in the standard x86 instruction set architecture.
These instructions can for example implement more complex se-
mantics that are tailored to a specific use case. By condensing
calculations into fewer instructions, caches are utilized more effec-
tively, increasing performance. Besides performance improvements,
new primitives can be added with new instructions. As microcode
can change the access level between operations, it is able read and
write kernel-only data structures. Combining this with fine-grained
checks enables fast access to otherwise privileged functions, with-
out support of the running kernel.
5 CASE STUDIES OF MICROCODE DEFENSES
Based on the security primitives discussed above, we now present
designs and proof-of-concept implementations of our microcode-
assisted systems defenses and constructive microcode applications.
For each case study, we first briefly motivate the primitive, present
the design and implementation, and conclude with an evaluation
and discussion of advantages and drawbacks of our approach. Based
on these case studies, we demonstrate that microcode indeed im-
proves properties of those applications with regards to performance,
security, and complexity. The microcode programs and supporting
infrastructure are publicly available [57].
The current state of the programs does not feature a mechanism
for runtime configuration, however this is can be achieved in dif-
ferent ways. As it is possible to load microcode updates during
runtime, the operating system can apply an update to enable or
disable certain features. It is also possible to add dedicated flags in
the thread or process control structures created by the operating
system to signal which features should be enabled for a certain
thread. However, both approaches require support from the OS to
either synchronize the microcode update procedure across all CPU
xor eax , eax
xor edi , edi
cpuid
rdtsc
xchg edi , eax
; benchmarked instruction
shrd ebp , ecx , 4
cpuid
rdtsc
sub eax , edi
Figure 4: Microbenchmark setup to determine the execution
time in cycles of shrd (double precision right shift). The
modern rdtscp instruction variant is not available on the
tested K8 CPU, thus the cpuid instruction is used to serial-
ize the instruction execution.
cores or allocate and initialize the configuration fields for every
new thread. Another option is to use processor-internal storage to
store configuration variables. Tests showed that a writable region
of memory exists that can be used to store these variables. Unfortu-
nately, further experiments are needed to ascertain the nature of
this memory region and the side effects of changing it at runtime.
We evaluate the performance of our case studieswithmicrobench-
marks of the affected instructions. To this end, we determine the
execution time in cycles as measured via the rdtsc instruction. It
provides the value of the Time Stamp Counter (TSC), a counter
which is incremented each clock cycle. The used code snippet for
performance benchmarks is illustrated in Figure 4. All tests were
performed on an AMD Sempron 3100+ running the minimal op-
erating system developed by Koppe et al. [49]. In the following,
the cycle counts are given without the overhead of the measure-
ment setup itself, which adds 65 cycles to every execution. Further
improvements to the performance properties of the defenses are
possible with a greater understanding of the underlying hardware.
This requires either more work on reverse engineering more details,
especially in regards to scheduling, or, to fully utilize the existing
hardware, assistance of the CPU vendors.
5.1 Customizable RDTSC Precision
Motivation. Previous works demonstrated the possibility to recon-
struct the memory layout [35, 39, 61] using timing side channels.
More recently the Spectre and Meltdown attacks have shown
in a spectacular way [37, 45, 53] that it is possible to break the
fundamental guarantees of memory isolation on modern systems.
A common aspect of these attacks is the usage of high-resolution
timers to observe the timing side channels. Due to these dangers,
modern browsers limit the accuracy of high-resolution timers to a
recommended value [36]. While this does not eliminate all timing
sources [47, 69], it raises implementation complexity of attacks and
provides a mitigation against common exploits.
On the native level the timing information is commonly queried
using the rdtsc instruction. The x86 architecture allows limiting
rdtsc to kernel space only. Any attempt of executing this instruc-
tion from user space will lead to a fault. Building upon this fact,
the operating system can limit the resolution of the timer avail-
able to user programs. Upon receiving the corresponding fault, the
operating system queries the TSC itself, reduces the resolution ac-
cordingly, and passes the timestamp onto the program. Note that
this incurs a significant performance overhead due to the necessary
context switches.
Design and Implementation. Since we are able to change x86
microcode behavior, our goal is to implement a functionality simi-
lar to the browser mitigation for the native rdtsc instruction. In
addition, our solution should be able to reduce the accuracy to
a pre-defined value without incurring unnecessary overhead in
form of context switches. To this end, we intercept the execution of
rdtsc and before the TSC value is made available to the application,
we set a pre-defined number of lower bits to zero. Note that the
amount of zeroed bits is configurable (in the microcode update) to
provide a trade-off between accuracy and security.
Evaluation andDiscussion.While the default implementation
of rdtsc takes 7 cycles to execute, our custom implementation
takes a total of 15 cycles to complete. This overhead is due to the
switch to microcode RAM and the additional logical AND operation
to clear the lower bits of the TSC value. The Register Transfer
Language (RTL) representation of our rdtsc implementation is
shown in the appendix in Listing 1.
Even though our solution doubles the execution time, it is far
faster than the approach where the kernel needs to trap the raised
interrupt. At the same time, our security guarantees are compa-
rable to the discussed browser mitigations. While raising the bar,
timing attacks are still possible by using methods described by
Schwarz et al. [69] and Kohlbrenner et al. [47].
5.2 Microcode-Assisted Address Sanitizer
Motivation. Address Sanitizer (ASAN) [70] is a compile-time in-
strumentation framework that introduces checks for every mem-
ory access in order to uncover both spatial and temporal software
vulnerabilities. In particular, temporal faults such as use-after-free
bugs present an important class of memory corruption vulnerabil-
ities that have been used to exploit browsers and other software
systems [78]. ASAN tracks program memory state in a so-called
shadow map that indicates whether or not a memory address is
valid. Therefore, ASAN inserts new instructions during compilation
to perform the checks as well as an instrumentation of allocators
and deallocators. In addition, ASAN enforces a quarantine period
for memory regions and thus prevents them from being re-used
directly. However, this instrumentation incurs a performance over-
head of roughly 100%.
To overcome the performance penalty and reduce the code size,
the authors of ASAN also discussed how a hardware-assisted ver-
sion, dubbed Address Sanitizer in Hardware (HWASAN), could
theoretically be implemented [71]. The basic idea is to introduce a
new processor instruction that performs access checks. The general
principle of the new instruction is illustrated in Figure 5. It receives
two parameters: the pointer to be accessed and the memory access
size. The instruction then validates the memory access and its size
with the help of the shadow map.
Design and Implementation. Instead of requiring a hardware
change to add the new HWASAN instruction, we design a scheme
CheckAddressAndCrashIfBad(Addr , kSize) {
ShadowAddr = (Addr >> 3) + kOffset;
if (kSize < 8) {
Shadow = LoadByte(ShadowAddr);
if (Shadow && Shadow <= (Addr & 7) + kSize - 1)
ReportBug(Addr);
} else {
Shadow = LoadNBytes(ShadowAddr , kSize / 8);
if (Shadow)
ReportBug(Addr);
}
}
Figure 5: Pseudocode of the HWASAN instruction [71];
kSize is the size of the memory access and kOffset is a com-
pile time constant that specifies the location of the shadow
map.
to implement HWASAN in microcode. Similarly to Figure 5, we
perform the checks accordingly and raise a fault in case an invalid
memory access is detected. To provide a clear separation between
application code and instrumentation, we implemented the check-
ing in a single instruction. For practical reasons, the interface should
be easy to add to existing toolchains.
In our implementation, we chose to reuse an existing but unused
x86 instruction, in this case the instruction bound. Since the check
requires address and size of the memory access, we changed the
interface of this instruction in the following way: the first operand
indicates the address to be accessed, while the second operand indi-
cates the access size. We want to emphasize that that our microcode
instrumentation can be emitted without changes to an existing x86
assembler using the following syntax:
bound reg , [size]
Similarly to ASAN, our instruction is inserted in front of every
memory access during compilation. We also use the same shadow
map mechanism and base address, hence the instrumentation re-
quires no additional changes. However, the key difference is the
compactness and that no externally visible state is changed. In case
the memory access is valid, the instruction behaves as a nop, but if
an invalid access is passed, a defined action is taken. To this end,
our prototype implementation currently support three methods of
error reporting:
(1) raising a standard access violation,
(2) raising the bound interrupt, and
(3) calling a predetermined x86 routine.
Note that the first two options rely on the availability of an excep-
tion handling mechanism, while the latter option is self-contained
and works even without kernel support.
Evaluation and Discussion.While the checking algorithm is
semantically the same, we observed a performance advantage of
our solution. The default ASAN implementation for a (valid) 4 byte
load requires 129 cycles to complete, our version requires only 106
cycles. Another advantage of our implementation is that no x86
register is changed during its execution: instead of using x86 gen-
eral purpose registers, our implementation stores temporary values
in ephemeral microcode-internal registers. This means the inser-
tion of the instrumentation does not increase the register pressure
and does not cause additional register spills to the stack. This is in
comparison to the original ASAN implementation which uses two
additional x86 registers to hold temporary values. The overhead of
additional register spills is not included in our benchmark as it is
highly dependent on the surrounding code. The RTL representa-
tion of our HWASAN implementation can be found in our Github
repository [57].
5.3 Microcoded Instruction Set Randomization
Motivation. In order to counter so-called code-injection attacks, a
series of works investigated Instruction Set Randomization (ISR)
schemes [10, 38, 44, 63, 66, 73] with the goal of preventing the
correct execution of maliciously injected code. To this end, the
instruction encoding is randomized (e.g., using an XOR with a pre-
defined key) for all or a subset of instructions, so that the adversary
does not know the semantics of a randomized instruction. Note that
recently published advanced schemes also aim to mitigate code-
reuse attacks using strong cryptographic encryption algorithms [72].
However, most schemes require hardware support, which prevents
their deployment to COTS CPUs.
Design and Implementation. Our ISR scheme removes the
link between the actual x86 operation and its semantics, and thus
an adversary is unable to infer the meaning of an instruction stream
even if disassembled during a Just-in-Time (JIT)-Return-oriented
Programming (ROP) attack. In order to be robust even when fac-
ing code-reuse or JIT-ROP attacks, we assume fine-grained code
randomization or software diversification.
Our proof-of-concept implementation supports six different oper-
ations: memory load, register move, add, left and right shift, and ex-
clusive or. Each operation can be freely assigned to any microcoded
x86 instruction that allows for one register operand and one mem-
ory operand. This assignment effectively binds the executed x86
code to a specific instance of the ISR. Execution is only possible
if the semantics implemented in microcode for each instruction
match the one used when generating the x86 code. Note that due
to this varying assignment and the variable instruction length of
the affected opcodes, it is not possible to assemble a ROP chain
or shellcode matching all possibilities. Additionally, we support
masking of input and output values before they are written to or
read from potentially attacker-accessible storage, including system
memory and registers.
To facilitate the translation of existing x86 code to opcodes us-
ing the newly introduced semantics of the ISR, we implemented a
transpiler. This transpiler processes a stream of disassembled x86
instructions and replaces all occurrences of supported opcodes with
the appropriate opcodes with changed semantics. The selection of
the replacement opcode is performed based on the assignment in
the corresponding microcode update. The input to the transpiler
is thus the source instruction stream and the mapping of x86 in-
structions to semantics as implemented by the ISR, the output is
a modified instruction stream. This output stream can them be
assembled by a standard x86 assembler, as no new instructions are
introduced.
Evaluation and Discussion.We evaluate the performance of
our implementation by comparing the runtime (measured in cycles
according to the test setup described previously) of a toy example
Figure 6: Control flow of an instrumentation.
consisting only out of supported opcodes with the corresponding
transpiled version. Our measurements indicate that our microcoded
ISR scheme introduces an overhead of 2.5 times on average over
a set of 5 different examples, compared to the same code running
natively. This overhead is mainly due to replacing non-microcoded
instructions (that normally take 1-3 cycles) with microcoded in-
structions that require at least 7 cycles, including the additional
overhead of switching to microcode RAM execution. We provide
one of the test cases in Listing 2 in the appendix. Note that the
cumulative performance of instruction streams may vary due to
pipelining and parallel execution. This is especially visible if instruc-
tions covered by the ISR are mixed with standard x86 instructions.
As our toy examples exclusively use transpiled instructions, we
arrive at the worst case overhead. Since the ISR can implement
more complex semantics such as a multiply-accumulate, the cy-
cle overhead can be reduced with a more advanced transpiler. We
want to emphasize that our ISR does not require hardware changes
compared to previous schemes and thus can be deployed on COTS
CPUs with a microcode update.
5.4 Microcode-Assisted Instrumentation
Motivation. Traditional binary defenses often suffer from either
significant performance overhead or incompleteness. This is typ-
ically due to the reliance on dynamic instrumentation or static
binary rewriting. However, with the ability to change the behavior
of x86 instructions via a microcode update, it is possible to inter-
cept only specific instructions without impacting performance of
unrelated code. Hence, a microcode-assisted instrumentation lever-
ages synergies of minimal performance overheads of static binary
rewriting and completeness of dynamic instrumentation solutions.
Design and Implementation. We designed a microcode-as-
sisted instrumentation scheme that allows generation of microcode
updates that intercept a specific instruction and upon execution of
this instruction, the control is transferred to a specific address. This
address contains standard x86 code to perform the instrumentation
and finally resume execution. The microcode update can addition-
ally contain a custom-tailored filtering, so that the x86 handler is
only invoked on specific conditions. As the filtering is implemented
directly in microcode, the overhead of changing the x86 execution
path which can invalidate branch prediction and caches is only
occurred when needed.
Evaluation and Discussion. To test the viability of the instru-
mentation, we implemented a proof-of-concept microprogram that
instruments shrd to call an x86 handler if a certain constant is
detected in the argument register. The control flow is illustrated in
Figure 6. Upon execution of the instruction, 1○ control is transferred
to the microcode RAM. 2○ As a filter, we check if the argument
register is equal to a constant. In case the filter does not match, the
instruction is executed normally and x86 execution continues after
shrd. In case the filter matches, 3○ the current instruction pointer
is pushed onto the stack and the x86 instrumentation part gains
control, comparable to a call instruction in x86. Once our instru-
mentation gains control, it can perform any number of calculations
and is not constrained by the size limitations of the microcode RAM.
4○ Finally, the instrumentation continues the normal execution by
returning to the interrupted code.
We also conducted a performance benchmark to determine the
overhead introduced by our instrumentation for the case where
the microcoded condition does not hold — illustrated with 2○ in
Figure 6. In this case, the x86 execution should continue as fast
as possible in order to reduce the overhead for any code not to
be inspected. We use the shrd instrumentation for this test and
measure the performance according to the described test setup.
The original implementation of shrd executed in 2 cycles, our test
case took 8 cycles. This overhead is mainly due to the switch to
microcode RAM and the two triads inserted for the instrumentation
check. The microcode RTL of the shrd instrumentation is available
in our Github repository [57].
While the execution time of the single instruction is increased
substantively, this overhead is fixed for any semantic the instruction
originally implements. This implies that our instrumentation only
adds 6 cycles to perform its own check, regardless of the original
run time of the instruction. Additionally, we do not introduce a
conditional x86 branch, which further increases the overhead due
to potential branch mis-predictions. Moreover, our implementation
does not use scratch x86 registers and thus does not increase reg-
ister pressure or causes additional memory accesses. Finally, the
overhead is only introduced for instructions that are to be inspected,
the rest of the execution is not impacted. This is in contrast to ex-
isting dynamic instrumentation frameworks, such as Valgrind [58],
PIN [55] or DynamoRIO [28], which increase the execution time for
all instructions. For a lightweight instrumentation, the overheads in-
duced by these tools are about 8.3, 2.5 or 5.1 times, respectively [55].
On top of our framework, any binary instrumentation relying
on intercepting of a small number x86 instructions can be realized.
Note that a current limitation is that only microcoded instructions
can be intercepted, however, this is a limitation of the current re-
verse engineering progress. Previous work indicated the possibility
of intercepting all instructions, included non-microcoded ones.
5.5 Authenticated Microcode Updates
Motivation.While the insufficiently protected microcode update
mechanism of AMD K8 and K10 processors enabled the research in
the first place, it simultaneously poses a major security issue: an
attacker can apply any update of her choosing, which was demon-
strated by Koppe et al. [49] by developing stealthy microcoded
Trojans. However, as the microcode update mechanism itself is
implemented in microcode, it is possible to develop a protection
mechanism in the form of a microcode update that can provide
limited security guarantees. We implement a proof-of-concept that
demonstrates the feasibility of such a scheme on the affected CPUs.
Design and Implementation. In order to mitigate the risk as-
sociated with the current scheme, a microcode update mechanism
is required that only accepts authenticated updates. However, given
the ephemeral nature of microcode updates, this countermeasure
requires either a hardware re-design or a trusted application (e.g.,
a part of Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) with secure
boot) that applies a suitable microcode update early during boot. In
particular, this update must then verify each further update attempt
using proper cryptographic primitives. At the same time, due to
the limited space in the microcode update, the verification has to
be small in terms of code size. Note that performance is of lesser
priority in this case since microcode updates are typically only
performed once per system start.
Our implementation extends the wrmsr instruction, which is used
to start the microcode update, to enforce the following properties
for the microcode update:
(1) The update includes 32 triads, the maximum possible number
on the K8 architecture. The vendor-supplied updates are
always padded to this length.
(2) A Hash-based message authentication code (HMAC) is ap-
pended to the update directly after the last triad.
(3) TheHMAC is correct for the full update, including the header.
The inclusion of the header in the authenticated part protects
the match registers and thus the affected instructions. The
key of the HMAC is included in the initial microcode update.
For our implementation, we choose the block cipher Tiny En-
cryption Algorithm (TEA) [81] due to the simplicity of its round
function which results in a small code size in the microcode RAM.
This is especially important as our current understanding of mi-
crocode semantics only allows loading of 16-bit immediate values
per microcode operation. Hence, loading of a single 64-bit constant
requires a total of 8 operations or nearly three triads (note that the
whole microcode update is limited to 32 triads only). While it would
be preferable to implement a strong cryptographic algorithm such
as Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), these commonly require
S-Boxes, which we cannot support due to code size constraints.
Evaluation and Discussion.As we extend the standard update
mechanism with an additional verification of the entire microcode
update, we incur a significant performance hit. In our tests, ap-
plying a maximum length update takes 5,377 cycles without the
authenticated update mechanism. With our deployed authentica-
tion scheme, loading the same update requires 68,525 cycles. This
increase is expected due to the added verification. As the update is
only applied once during system boot, the performance hit is still
negligible. For comparison, the AMD 15h architecture (Bulldozer
etc.) requires 753,913 cycles on average for an update [14]. This
generation likely uses a public key scheme to verify the update.
Due to code size limitation we were limited to the simple and
small TEA algorithm and could not implement a public key verifi-
cation scheme. However, if the update authentication mechanism
were contained in the microcode ROM directly, the code size would
not be as restricted. While our ROM readout indicates a very high
usage of the available triads, there are still more padding triads
present than would fit into a microcode update. In our prototype
implementation, the user can decide which updates to trust, or
given the possibility to disassemble the updates, even which parts
of an update should be applied. This allows for a finer control over
the hardware than what would be possible using only a vendor-
accessible signature method. The RTL of our microcode authenti-
cation scheme is available in our Github repository [57].
5.6 µEnclave
Motivation. Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) [18] is an in-
struction set extension that introduces the creation of isolated,
trusted execution environmentswith privatememory regions. These
so-called enclaves are protected from processes even at high priv-
ilege levels and enable secure remote computation. Inspired by
SGX we designed and implemented a proof-of-concept enclave func-
tionality, dubbed µEnclave. µEnclave can remotely attest that code
indeed runs inside the enclave and ensures confidentiality of data.
We can thus retrofit basic enclave functionality to older CPUs not
offering a comparable solution. Additionally, we use this case study
to illustrate the isolation property of microcode.
Design and Implementation. We leverage the separate mi-
crocode IDU to establish an isolated execution environment. The
other decode units are halted while the microcode IDU is active
by design of the microarchitecture. Due to these isolation proper-
ties we can safely assume that x86 code, even when running with
kernel-level privileges, cannot interfere with the enclave program
implemented in microcode at run time.
µEnclave is based on the authenticated microcode update mech-
anism, presented in Section 5.5, and the following strategy:
(1) The trust is built upon the symmetric key contained in the
first microcode update applied early during boot by UEFI.
The entity controlling that key may be a chip manufacturer,
software vendor, or the end-user. The entity has to ensure
that payload microcode updates contain only benign behav-
ior before signing it.
(2) The program that is supposed to run in the µEnclave is im-
plemented in microcode and embedded in a signed payload
microcode update.
(3) The enclave program may perform arbitrary computations
and access virtual memory. The enclave program may write
sensitive data into RAM, but it must ensure security prop-
erties like authenticity, integrity, and secrecy itself using
signing and encryption.
(4) The enclave program can remotely attest that it indeed runs
within the enclave by signing a message with the symmetric
enclave key.
Discussion. In combination with a challenge-response protocol,
µEnclave enables remote attestation and additional services of the
enclave can be exposed either via augmenting x86 instructions or
adding new MSRs. A major drawback of µEnclave is the restricted
code size due to the microcode RAM size. This limitation can be
lifted by either implementing a small virtual machine and interpret-
ing signed bytecode from main memory or iteratively streaming
signed microcode from main memory to microcode RAM as it exe-
cutes. For the latter, we are missing the micro-ops that can write
to microcode RAM. While our current implementation does not
support either approach, this is not a fundamental limitation of
µEnclave.
When compared to sophisticated trusted execution environ-
ments such as Intel SGX or ARM TrustZone, µEnclave is more
cumbersome to use. As the enclave code needs to be written as
microcode, the development requires experience with this envi-
ronment. Additionally, the limited code size limits the selection of
cryptographic primitives to those with very small implementations.
This results in the use of less secure cryptographic algorithms and
thus lower security guarantees. Finally, the CPU lacks hardware
support and acceleration for cryptographic operations. This means,
for example, that the attestation needs to be implemented by the
programmers of enclave code themselves. However, µEnclave can
be used on older CPUs that do not provide the mentioned vendor
supplied solutions. As such, it is possible to add similar primitives
to legacy CPUs without requiring a hardware change.
6 DISCUSSION AND FUTUREWORK
In this section, we discuss benefits and challenges of microcode-
assisted system defenses and review limitations of microcode in
general and of our reverse engineering approach in particular. Fur-
thermore, we present and discuss potential topics for future work
such as microcode-assisted shadow stacks, lightweight syscalls as
well as information isolation. We also shed light on how microcode
Trojans can be detected.
6.1 Microcode for System Defenses
Modern processor microcode and the ability to update microcode
can provide useful primitives such as enabling or disabling CPU
features at runtime, intercepting instruction decoding or other mi-
croarchitectural processes to modify existing behavior, providing a
small execution environment isolated from the operating system
kernel, and bypassing some boundaries of the x86 ISA to implement
new features. We have shown in Section 5 that these primitives
enable the implementation of some defensive schemes like cus-
tomizable accuracy of the built-in x86 timer and µEnclave in the
first place. Other defenses such as microcoded HWASAN and ISR
benefit from these primitives with regard to performance overhead
and complexity. With more knowledge about microcode, additional
defenses like opaque shadow stacks and information isolation can
be built, as we discuss in Sections 6.4 and Section 6.5. However, the
generality of microcoded primitives suffers due to the limited num-
ber of processor models that currently accept custom microcode
updates. We argue that the introduction of an open and documented
microcode API could benefit system security research and future
defensive systems. Such an API has to address several challenges
like abstracting the underlying changes through processor gen-
erations, conflict handling for concurrent updates, and ensuring
system stability. In order to avoid microcode malware, processor
vendors could introduce an opt-in development mode that allows
self-signed updates. Software vendors that want to use such an
update in the field, e.g., with processors not in development mode,
have to go through a signing process with the CPU vendor.
6.2 Limitations
At first, we review the limitations of microcode in general. The
execution speed of certain computations can be speed up by several
orders of magnitude by implementing the algorithm in hardware,
e.g., in an ASIC or FPGA. Such performance gains do not apply to
computations moved from an x86 implementation to microcode, be-
cause essentially it is still software. Merely the decoding is changed,
but the resulting operations performed by the functional units of the
processor are similar. Furthermore, the intervention of microcode
in microarchitectural processes directly implemented in hardware
is limited. Custom microcode updates are thus limited to chang-
ing the semantics of x86 instructions within the constraints of the
existing internal RISC instruction set. To the best of our knowl-
edge, no mechanisms exists to periodically trigger an action in
microcode to implement an asynchronous monitoring. All actions
of custom microcode programs needs to be triggered by an external
event. However, as it is possible to intercept arbitrary instructions
and microcode-internal processes, there are multiple options to
implement a basic form of such a monitoring.
Our microcode research is further limited due to our incomplete
knowledge of microcode and the underlying microarchitecture. The
information gained through reverse engineering may lack impor-
tant details or even contain mistakes. This can only be resolved with
access to the official documentation of the used features. Our mi-
croprograms only run on AMD K8 to K10 family based processors.
More modern CPUs include effective authentication schemes, such
as RSA-based public key cryptography, which would need to be
bypassed in order to apply a custom update. The microcode update
size of the affected CPUs is limited to 32 triads, which prohibits the
implementation of large microprograms. We partly bypassed this
restriction by introducing x86 callbacks. However, this bypass is
not feasible in scenarios with untrusted operating system kernels
such as µEnclave. More recent CPUs use larger microcode updates,
which is an indication that their patch RAM is larger and can po-
tentially accommodate more complex updates. Despite the limited
code size on the tested CPUs no upper bound on the execution time
of microcode was encountered and we were able to lock up the
CPUs by forcing it into an endless loop in microcode. Furthermore,
we currently can only hook microcoded x86 instructions. Detailed
lists of these microcoded instructions for the K8 architecture can
be found in [2] at pages 273ff. The instructions listed as VectorPath
are microcoded instructions and Direct/DoublePath instructions
are decoded in hardware. While there are indications that it is pos-
sible to intercept all instructions, our current reverse engineering
results do not allow for this. Lastly, the microcode ROM readout
contains non-correctable read errors induced by dust particles or
irregularities. We are currently working on improving the readout
and obtaining an error-free version.
6.3 Correctness of Reverse Engineering Results
As our results are based on reverse engineering, we can not guar-
antee their correctness. Additionally we are limited to observing
the output of the CPU, any additional details of the microarchitec-
ture such as scheduling or internal state updates are hidden from
us. The observations might constitute unintended behavior of the
CPU when used outside of its specifications. However, we verified
our conclusions using available resources where possible. A strong
indication that our results are indeed correct is the fact that we can
construct complex microcode programs that behave as expected
when executed on the CPU. Additionally the behavior is consistent
between CPUs of the AMD K8 and K10 families, even though they
differ in details such as cache sizes, core counts, or feature size,
and even certain implementation details such as the selection of
microcoded instructions. There are also parallels between our re-
sults and the descriptions found in the patent describing the RISC86
instruction set [30], which appears to be used internally by the CPU.
For example, the encoding for the conditional codes of microcode
jumps are the same as stated in the patent. We also found similari-
ties in the encoding of individual opcodes, albeit with differences
in length and number of opcode fields. Lastly, certain operations,
most prominently multiple division variants or steps, and internal
register functions, e.g. the address of the next x86 instruction to
be executed, are closely related. After reconstructing the mapping
between virtual and physical microcode addresses we could also lo-
cate the implementation of specific x86 instructions. By comparing
the disassembled microcode with the expected function of the x86
instruction, we determined that we indeed correctly interpret the
bit sequences. Examples of this are the instructions shrd, whose
implementation shows shifts of the argument registers according
to the specifications and the wrmsr opcode, which at its start has a
large number of instructions comparing ECX (the register number
to write to) to specific values consistent with the documented in-
terface. We also verified individual microcode instructions on their
own by copying the bit sequences to a microcode update, executing
them and comparing the output. This was extended upon during
the development of the microcode emulator for which we tested
different input states on both the emulator and the CPU to ensure
the correctness of our emulation.
A final confirmation of the correctness can be achieved with the
cooperation of the CPU vendors. The availability of official specifi-
cations and documentation would allow for a faster development
of custom microcode programs and could potentially allow better
usage of available CPU features. Unfortunately, we did not receive
a response from AMD after we contacted them.
6.4 Shadow Stacks
During our research, we considered an opaque shadow stack im-
plementation as a potent use case for a constructive microprogram.
However, due to the fact that ret (near, without immediate) is not
implemented in microcode, we can not instrument this instruction.
As this instruction is a key requirement in implementing an opaque
shadow stack, we were unable to create a proof-of-concept. As
CPU vendors are able to determine the logic on non-microcoded
instructions during the design process, they are able to implement
such a shadow stack. Below we discuss the advantages of an opaque
shadow stack retrofitted by microcode.
Shadow stack defenses implement a second stack that is kept in
sync with the system’s default stack. Shadow stacks often possess
special properties in order to achieve certain security goals. For
example, the shadow stack can be placed in memory that cannot
be accessed by normal program instructions [50], the direction of
growth can be inverted to detect illegal stack accesses that yield
diverging results [68], or the shadow stack stores only fixed-size
elements to preserve control-flow metadata in the event of a stack-
based buffer overflow [16]. Shadow stacks ensure the integrity of
sensitive data on the stack. Therefore, they are often integrated in
code-reuse defenses such as CFI [15, 16, 23, 59] in order to protect
the backward edge of the control flow. Due to their nature, shadow
stack implementations need to extend the logic of instructions
operating on the stack such as call and ret. Software-based imple-
mentations achieve this by adding instructions at all occurrences
during compilation [16, 23, 26, 50] or with static binary rewriting.
In 2015, Davi et al. [24] proposed a hardware-assisted shadow stack
implementation with low performance overhead. However, the de-
fense still requires the insertion of instructions into the protected
application.
Shadow stacks can also be implemented in an opaque way. The
semantic of existing stack operations is extended rather than rely-
ing on the addition of instructions. Benefits of this approach are
compatibility with legacy applications, protection of the whole
software stack instead of transformed applications and software
libraries only, and potential performance gains due to smaller code
size as well as improved utilization of the underlying microarchitec-
ture. Depending on the implementation details, stronger security
properties can be enforced, e.g., by placing the shadow stack at a
memory area not accessible by conventional user mode instructions.
Intel released the specification of CET containing a shadow stack in
2016 and added GCC support in 2017 [17, 82]. However, to date no
processor with CET support has been released. The CET shadow
stack is opaque except for some new management instructions
such as switch shadow stack. We argue that these management
instructions will be microcoded, because they implement complex
logic and are not performance critical due to their rare occurrence.
6.5 Lightweight Syscalls
The syscall interface is provided by the processor and the operating
system to offer services to user space. During its setup, the pointer
to the syscall handler in kernel space and the kernel stack pointer
are stored in MSRs. Once the syscall instruction is invoked, the
processor reads the corresponding MSRs, switches the stack, and
redirects control flow. The syscall handler then invokes the handler
for the requested service according to the given syscall number
in register eax. The service handler sanitizes the inputs, checks
access privileges (where applicable) and performs its desired action.
Ultimately, control is transfered back to user space via the sysret
instruction by restoring segment registers, again switching stack
and redirecting control to the stored instruction pointer.
The performance overhead imposed by syscalls discourages de-
fenses from invoking them frequently. Thus, vital and critical run-
time metadata of defenses are kept in the user space, where they
are exposed to attackers. To thwart potential tampering with the
metadata, many different kinds of information hiding schemes were
introduced in the past years [16, 23, 50, 54]. However, information
hiding has been shown to be ineffective in several attack scenar-
ios [29, 33, 34, 48]. We propose lightweight syscalls implemented in
microcode, which are assigned to a dedicated opcode. They leave
segment registers, the x86 instruction pointer, and the stack in
place. Once the opcode is executed, the microcode implementation
switches to kernel mode, performs a desired action, and switches
back to user mode. The action is specific to the needs of the par-
ticular defense and could for example be a restricted read or write
to the defense’s metadata in kernel memory. Note that special care
must be taken during implementation of the microcode update to
not introduce a privilege escalation vulnerability. With lightweight
syscalls, defenses such as CFI and Code-Pointer Integrity (CPI) can
migrate from information hiding to information isolation enforced
by the privilege level of the processor. This can potentially further
harden existing defenses against advanced adversaries. Due to the
nature of lightweight syscalls, we estimate a low performance over-
head. Based on our limited knowledge about microcode, we were
unfortunately unable to implement and evaluate such an approach.
Future work should explore such a microcode-based defense primi-
tive.
6.6 Microcode Trojan Detection
Koppe et al. have shown that microcode updates can contain mali-
cious behavior [49]. All presented microcode Trojans rely on the
same mechanism to gain initial control, namely the interception
of x86 instruction decoding. We found that the interception and
the additionally executed micro-ops cause a measurable timing dif-
ference. In this paper, we showed that a related technique, namely
microcode-assisted instrumentation, already exhibits a measurable
performance overhead. Our further tests indicate that even if only
a single triad—the smallest possible insertion—is inserted into the
logic of an instruction, the overhead can already bemeasured. Given
the unavoidable overhead of switching to the microcode RAM, a
backdoor inserted via a microcode update is in general detectable.
A detection engine can create a base line by measuring the tim-
ing of all instructions with no microcode update applied. Then the
engine takes a second measurement with the update under test,
compares the results, and reports any timing differences. Note that
this method only detects x86 instruction hooks and not necessarily
malicious behavior. A malicious update does not always need to in-
sert additional logic into existing instructions, it could, for example,
modify the handling of certain, potentially undocumented, MSRs.
In order to also detect such modifications, the microcode update
needs to be decoded and, for example, statically analyzed. Program
analysis methods would also consider logic that is not inserted at
instruction decoding but other internal processes like exception
handling on the microarchitectural level. It is also possible to reason
about the Trojan’s semantics, thus yielding more accurate results.
Trojans (or CPU vulnerabilities that can be exploited as backdoors)
can also occur in the microcode ROM. The detection of these is
more challenging, because their behavior is also contained in the
baseline measurement and the ROM contents need to be read out
to apply static analyses.
However, the same problems that plague traditional malware
identification are also applicable to the detection of microcode Tro-
jans. Even if the whole microcode, both ROM and RAM, is available
for analysis, it can be hard to determine if a certain code fragment
is benign or malicious in nature. This problem is amplified due the
limited understanding of microcode internals. But even access to
the full documentation on the subject would not be sufficient, as
it is possible to use obfuscation to hide the true nature of a code
fragment. Lastly, it would be possible to insert a backdoor outside of
the microcode engine and directly change the other functional units
of the CPU. All-in-all detecting microcode Trojans—or hardware
backdoors in general—is a difficult problem in the face of powerful
adversaries.
6.7 Supporting Newer and Different
Architectures
While we were able to apply our understanding of the K8 architec-
ture to programming for the K10 architecture, other architectures
are far more difficult to support. As the K10 is a close evolution
of the K8, the microcode engine remained largely the same. We
mainly noticed differences in the selection of microcoded instruc-
tions. For example, the K10 architecture moved the decoding of all
ret instructions to hardware, while the K8 still performed decod-
ing for some variants of it in microcode. Moving more instructions
to the hardware decoder usually results in better performance as
microcoded decoding takes more time. During our investigation we
also determined that the entry points for microcoded instructions
were constant between K8 and K10, but the implementation then
branched to different triads during execution.
The major problem when adapting our findings to new archi-
tectures is the strong cryptographic authentication of microcode
updates for newer CPUs. Only with the ability to execute arbitrary
code on the hardware, it was possible to gain an understanding
of the fundamental encoding of microcode [49]. Without such a
possibility, any analysis is restricted to interpreting existing code,
usually in the form of microcode updates. However, even the K8
and K10 architectures use a form of scrambling to obfuscate the
plain text of the updates. Analysis of more modern updates shows
that those are most likely protected by strong cryptographic primi-
tives [11] and thus cannot be analyzed as is. However, even if the
plain text of such an update is acquired, without a specification or
a system to execute the code, it is still challenging to recover the
microcode semantics. Large amounts of data and at least some basic
information on the intended functionality of the update would be
needed to infer any meaning. Given the comparatively small size of
microcode updates (usually in the range of hundreds of kilobytes
for a single CPU), this would probably not be feasible in practice.
Another possibility is the analysis of the microcode ROM or
engine directly. Analyzing the engine itself would yield a detailed
understanding of the encoding and available functionality of mi-
crocode, but modern small feature sizes and the high complexity
of current CPUs render this approach difficult. While reading the
ROM directly is not as difficult as analyzing a highly optimized
microcode engine, it does not immediately yield the plain text mi-
crocode. As our reverse engineering process showed, we had to
invert multiple permutations of the readout bits in order to obtain
the plain text encoding. This process was heavily dependent on
both previous understanding of the encoding and the ability to
execute chosen microcode on the CPU, both of which would not
be available. Also there would be no way of verifying the findings,
as the CPU would not accept custom updates without the correct
signature. While the public key of the signature could possibly be
extracted from the CPU, the required private key would only be
available to the vendor. Modifying a single CPU via chip editing
might resolve this issue, but such an approach again requires mas-
sive hardware reverse engineering efforts and access to specialized
and expensive lab equipment able to operate at the small feature
size. Also such an edit would only allow a single CPU to load the
custom update, any unedited CPU would refuse it.
In summary, supporting newer CPUs is mostly prevented by
strong authentication of microcode updates. Once the authentica-
tion is circumvented, e.g., by the use of chip editing or side-channel
attacks, our reverse engineering methods can be applied to infer mi-
crocode features. However, vendor support for custom microcode
updates is still the most viable approach to modifying the behavior
of CPUs.
7 CONCLUSION
Vulnerabilities affecting security and safety have accompanied com-
puter systems since their early days. To copewith attacks, numerous
defense strategies have been integrated both in software and hard-
ware. In particular, hardware-based defenses implemented with
microcode provide increased security and performance, as recently
shown by the microcode updates released to address Spectre and
Meltdown. However, little is publicly known how security mech-
anisms are implemented in hitherto closed-source microcode.
In this paper, we demonstrated how modern system security
defenses and tools can be implemented in microcode on a mod-
ern COTS x86 CPU. Among others, we provided details how to
implement timing attack mitigations, instruction set randomiza-
tion, and enclave functionality. To this end, we first uncovered new
x86 microcode details by a more in-depth hardware reverse engi-
neering and novel strategies to validate the semantics. Finally, we
discussed perspectives of customizable microcode and highlighted
useful primitives offered by microcode to arm the system security
defense landscape.
In order to foster future research in the area of processor mi-
crocode and its applications, we publish the source code of the
applications described in this paper as well as the framework used
for manipulating and generating microcode [57]. We hope this will
enable other researchers to extend and build upon our work to
design and implement microprograms.
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A APPENDIX
A.1 Hardware Details of the Microcode ROM
Figure 7 shows a SEM image of one of the four Region Of Interests (ROIs). As an extension to previous work by Koppe et al. [49], we
further delayered the chip to analyze the region above the array A2 — the second array from the bottom. Its repetitive structure looked
visually different compared to the other analyzed NOR-ROM arrays. A cross section and an additional delayering process revealed a
prominent structure in the layer underneath, due to which we identified the area as SRAM. Compared to modern Dynamic random-access
memory (DRAM), SRAM uses more space but can be manufactured in the same process as the adjacent NOR-ROM. Additionally, SRAM
does not require periodic refreshes to retain the stored data and is often used in microcontrollers and smaller System on a Chips (SOCs). The
usage of two different storage types in this close proximity is an indication of a highly optimized in-house design process. The common
practice is to use (third-party) Intellectual Property (IP) cores providing a single memory type.
In the ROM, the microcode triads are ordered with an eight line interleaving, meaning that in a linear readout the successor of a triad
is found seven triads ahead. This ordering was verified by searching for all-zero triads at the end of the array A2. After encountering the
first all-zero triad, more were found at the expected seven triad distance. Moreover, the hardware layout already hints at the usage of
this technique. Note that these and other techniques used are not implemented for the sake of obfuscating the ROM contents, but instead
optimize the storage in regards to die area.
Figure 7: SEM image of region R1. The middle part contains the wiring and addressing for the ROM and RAM. To reduce the
average signal path length, the wiring is placed between the two memory areas.
A.2 RTL Representations of Microcode Programs
In the following, we list the RTL form of our custom microcode programs described in the paper. The RTL is the same as used by
Koppe et al. [49] and follows the x86 assembly syntax closely. Where appropriate, the differences to the x86 syntax are highlighted in a
comment. A major difference is the availability of a three operand mode. In that case, the left-most operand is the destination, the remaining
two operands are the sources. More examples can be found in our Github repository [57].
Listing 1: Implementation of our custom rdtsc variant with reduced accuracy. It completely replaces the default by intercept-
ing triad 0x318, the entry point for this instruction on the K8 architecture. The dbg opcode that is used for the read of an
internal register sets certain flags that are not currently supported with standard annotations in the RTL. We omitted the
check of the CR4.TSD control bit, which optionally prevents access to this instruction from usermode. While we were able to
partially reconstruct the check from the ROM readout, we encountered a read error during this and cannot fully and reliably
reconstruct the corresponding semantics. However, this is a limitation of the current state of reverse engineering and we are
working on improving the readout method.
; implement default rdtsc semantics , loading TSC to edx:eax
; emit a fixed bitstring , this instruction reads an internal register
dbg 0001010000101111111000000011111111111111110001101010000000001011
; .q annotation switches to 64 bit operand size
; srl performs a logic shift right
srl.q rdx , t9q , 32
srl.q rax , t9q , 0
; load the and mask
mov t1d , 0xffff
sll t1d , 16
or t1d , 0xff00
; sequence word annotation , continue at the next x86 instruction
; the following triad is still executed after this annotation
.sw_complete
; reduce accuracy of the lower 32 bit TSC
; includes two operations as padding
and eax , t1d
add t2d , 0
add t2d , 0
Listing 2: Assembly code of a test case for the ISR. The original x86 assembly code is shown on the left. The right side is the
translation performed by our transpiler. Each source instructionmaps to a single replacement instruction. In this case we used
a single instruction, bound, to implement all semantics, but it is also possible to repurpose multiple different x86 instructions.
The correct handler is selected by the lower 16 Bits of the displacement given in brackets. The higher 16 Bits are used as an
optional argument for the selected handler. In the case of memory loads, the argument is the 16 Bit offset of the memory
location to be loaded relative to a fixed base address. The argument to the shift handler is the amount of bits to shift. The
mapping of handler number to semantics is the trivial case in this example: the handler indices are used directly. However,
the full 16 Bits are available to identify handlers. This also allows for using multiple different indices for the same handler,
further strengthening the ISR.
mov esi , [msg0]
mov edi , [msg1]
mov ecx , [rc]
add edi , ecx
add esi , edi
mov edi , esi
add esi , esi
shr esi , 8
add esi , edi
bound esi , [eax + 0x1]
bound edi , [eax + 0x40001]
bound ecx , [eax + 0x180001]
bound edi , [ecx + 0x4]
bound esi , [edi + 0x4]
bound edi , [esi + 0x0]
bound esi , [esi + 0x4]
bound esi , [eax + 0x80003]
bound esi , [edi + 0x4]
